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NOTES
CO-OPERATIVEs-TAATION OF "PATRONAGE REFUNDS" THE REAL
IssuE?-The first concentrated attack on the existence of co-operatives
since their judicial recognition is now under way. This is easily under-
standable because the very nature of a co-operative is such as to give
rise to heated discussion in circles of inquiring theoretical economists
and practical businessmen. Basically co-operatives are organizations
by which or through which goods are purchased or sold, the members
of the organization exercising the co-operative unity of action to im-
prove their bargaining power. It is this unity of action, the very heart
of the co-operative, which foments discussion and objection.
From the very beginning co-operatives have undergone a rigid judi-
cial examination because of this principle of unified action. Opponents
of the co-operative principle demanded that co-operatives, which at first
were almost exclusively agricultural marketing groups, be tested on the
same basis as every other business organization or economic method.
Many men felt that the rules of law as well as the rules of business in
the United States excluded anything so opposed to the tenets of free
enterprise as a co-operative. But the courts almost unanimously upheld,
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as valid, statutes which authorized the co-operative combinations; the
courts justified this deviation from the free enterprise system on the
grounds that the inferior bargaining power of the farmer resulted in eco-
nomic injustice.1 Evidence abounded, said the courts, that the princi-
ples of free enterprise as practiced did not result in economic justice to
the agricultural group; therefore if the legislature so decided, farmers, as
a group, had the right to combine in co-operative efforts to balance the
bargaining scales.
With legislative 2 and judicial 3 blessing co-operatives have steadily
grown until today it is reported that two-thirds of the farmers of the
United States are members of co-operatives, 4 either marketing or con-
sumer. But the method of cooperation has not been confined solely to
agricultural activities. In fact, practically every phase of business has
been carried on by one group or another on co-operative principles.
Very few of those who opposed co-operatives in their inception have
been converted to an acceptance of them as legitimate parts of a free
enterprise economy. The co-operatives' reception and expansion have
not convinced the rugged individualist of their validity. It is the opin-
ion of the free enterprise businessifian that the courts are in error when
they permit co-operatives to exist while the Fourteenth Amrendment
remains in effect. They also feel that co-operatives are no more than a
governmentally privileged restraint of trade.5 Even further, the free en-
terprise economic philosopher points to the great material wealth and
progress that the United States has made under the individualistic sys-
tem, and he cannot help but question the wisdom of undermining this
heretofore successful method of economic activity by the institution of
planned economy measures, one of which, he feels, is co-operative ac-
tivity.
It has now become apparent that, for the above reasons, there is a
concerted program being carried out to completely eradicate co-opera-
tives from the American economic field. The strongest force laboring
against the co-operatives is the National Tax Equality Association.
This association exploits the fact that the co-operative does not pay
1 Note, 22 NOTRE DAmnz LAwyER 413 (1947) providing a discussion and cita-
tion of the cases evidencing judicial acceptance of co-operatives.
2 All states have statutes authorizing the incorporation of co-operatives.
3 Note, 22 NOTRE DA:Mi LAWYER 413 (1947), supra, note 1.
4 UNiTED STATES NEws, September 12, 1947, p. 15-16.
5 But see Note, 23 NOTRE Dumi LAWYER 110 (1947). Also UNTED STATEs
Naws, September 12, 1947, p. 15-16, supra, note 4, reports that a study made by
the Small Business Committee headed by Representative Patman (D. Texas) in
1946 concluded that co-operatives had no unfair advantage over private competi-
tors. It must be remembered that this survey was conducted in 1946 by a Congress
of more progressive philosophies.
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taxes on what is known as a "patronage refund".6 This labelling of the
co-operative as a "tax evader" is part of the propaganda designed to
smooth the path for revision of tax statutes so as to include co-opera-
tives' "patronage refunds" in the co-operative tax bill. In addition to the
tax issue, co-operatives have been attacked in the public eye as unfair
monopolies through the recently popularized method of majority rep-
resentation propaganda, the congressional investigation." The free en-
terprise businessman of today cites the existence of tremendous manu-
factories and industries operating on the co-operative principle in the
same locality as competing non-co-operative concerns, the co-operative
paying no taxes on its members' income, whereas the competitor oper-
ates under the tax burden on its profits.8 How then, legally, does the
co-operative avoid taxation?
As has been stated, a co-operative is an organization by which or
through which goods are purchased or sold. The co-operative functions
as the fiduciary of the producers or consumers. In the case of a market-
ing co-operative the co-operative advances to the producer a certain
sum for the member-producer's goods. Then after an agreed period the
co-operative calculates the price at which the goods of all the members
were sold and refunds to each producer the difference between the price
at which the goods were sold by the co-operative and that advance al-
ready given the producer, less co-operative operating expenses. Under
this basic co-operative theory, then, we see that the profits at no time
accrue to the co-operative itself. The member is the party who realizes
the profits on the goods produced and sold. That this is and must be the
situation, under law, in which a co-operative exists becomes apparent
when we examine the construction that courts have given to the con-
tracts between the co-operative and its members which enunciate the
relationship of the parties to the contract.
It is generally held that co-operative marketing contracts create be-
tween the members and the association the relation of principal and
6 Also known as patronage dividends or patronage rebates.
7 Representative Walter Ploeser (R. Missouri) heads the House Small Busi-
ness Sub-committee which is going about the country investigating co-operatives.
This investigation has found, among other things, that the Greenbelt Consumer
Service, a consumer co-operative venture which embraced two food stores, a
drugstore, a variety store, a movie theatre, a garage, a bus line, a traveling store,
a laundry and dry cleaning establishment, a tobacco and candy store, a barber shop
and a beauty parlor all operating on the co-operative principle, to be a monopoly.
THE NATION, August 30, 1947, p. 194. THE CmuTrw CENTURY, September 17,
1947, p. 1100.
8 State ex rel. Am, Attorney General v. Consumers Co-operative Association
et al., 163 Kan. 324, 183 P. (2d) 423 (1947), Noted in 23 NOTRE DAIM LAWYER
110. The abuse on which investigation of co-operative activities may focus atten-
tion is private business masquerading as co-operative ventures. UNITED STATES
NEws, September 12, 1947, p. 15-16.
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agent. 9 The courts 'subscribe to this construction of the majority of co-
operative-member contracts because, they say, it is the intention of the
parties when setting up a co-operative that such a relationship be cre-
ated. Any other construction, the courts feel, would negative the over-
all purpose of a co-operative. Therefore to carry out the obvious intent
of the parties, the principal and agent relationship must result. Con-
cededly, the co-operative is a fiduciary for the members, and the most
apparent type of fiduciary under these circumstances would be an
agent; thus the principal and agent construction, the courts hold, must
logically follow. A few courts have construed the relationship to be that
of vendor and vendee in a strict construction of the terms of the con-
tract.' 0 Others, however, even when the wording of the contract indi-
cates that the products are to be sold by the member and bought by
the co-operative, look to the overall purpose of the agreement and con-
strue the relationship to be one of principal and agent rather than ven-
dor and vendee."
Ultimately, of course, the courts announce their decision as to the
relationship between co-operative and member as resulting from a per-
ception of the intention of the parties in drawing up the contract. The
overall purpose of a co-operative, naturally, lends great weight to the
principal-agent presumption but the courts examine other circumstances
of the relationship also. Intention of agency is principally shown, of
course, by the fact that the selling price of the goods is not the property
of the co-operative but rather is the property of the members and is
refunded accordingly at specified times. Also indicative of agency is the
fact that the co-operative can only act in relation to the goods in the
capacity authorized by contract. The co-operative takes goods for a def-
inite and restricted purpose, namely sale 12 for the benefit of members.
9 Am. Jua., AGEcNC 24.
10 Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association v. Stovall, 113 Tex. 273, 253 S.W.
1101 (1923);,Dairy Products Association v. National Cheese Producers' Federation,
217 Wis. 202, 257 N.W. 624, 98 A.L.R. 1403 (1934).
11 "It is generally recognized that there are two kinds of co-operative market-
ing agreements, sales and agency, and that the determination of whether a particular
agreement is to be classified as one or the other depends upon the intention of the
parties thereto. (Citing cases). In California, however, co-operative marketing
agreementi have been classified or construed as contracts of agency even when, as
in this case, they contained language of sale." Irvine Company v. McColgan, Fran-
chise Tax Commissioner, 26 Cal. (2d) 160, 157 P. (2d) 847 (1945). In Texas Cer-
tified Cottonseed Breeders' Association v. Aldridge, 122 Tex. 464, 61 S.W. (2d) 79
(1933), the court held that the intent of the parties to create a typical co-opera-
tive must control literal wording even though that wording indicates a sale agree-
ment. The opinion states, "If necessary, to give effect to intention of parties to
marketing contract, courts will brush aside mere form and examine the contract as
a whole, in the light of the nature and circumstances of the transaction."
12 "The profit incentive is the mainspring of commerce, but it is the antithesis
of co-operation. The co-operative principle requires that services be performed for
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The inference that the relationship is one of vendor and vendee is based
on the fact that the co-operative exercises dominion over the goods by
mingling, handling, processing, storing, borrowing money thereon, pool-
ing and selling the goods. Once the member parts with the goods there
is no provision for return, and his goods are mingled with all others so
that his patronage refund is not based on the result of the sale of his
particular goods but on his membership in the co-operative. 13 In a sale
it is not necessary that the price be paid at the time of contracting. In
view of this, some courts have held that the patronage refund, so called,
was merely the final installment of the purchase price. paid by the co-
operative to the member.
It is apparent, then, that in a true co-operative the proceeds re-
ferred to as "patronage refunds" (which the National Tax Equality
Association demands be included in the co-operative tax expense)
never, by virtue of the fiduciary capacity of the co-operative, are to be
considered co-operative property, much less co-operative profits. The
"refund" is either the final installment of a sales price being paid by
a vendee to a vendor or it is a fund of the principal which the agent
was authorized to collect and return to the principal at a designated
time. The "refunds", being member-producer property, should be in-
cluded in the members' taxable incomes, of course.
Thus we see that it is not tax equality at all which is desired but
rather a restriction on co-operatives as co-operatives. We are brought
back in our discussion, then, to what now appears as the basic point in
the co-operating members by their appointed representatives, and not by independ-
ent business units dealing at arm's length and striving for profit. It implies that the
co-operating members are the real parties in interest in any transaction under-
taken by their association. At no time can the association as a corporate entity have
any interest in the marketed product adverse to the interest of the members for
whose benefit the operations are conducted. Yet so far as it is possible without
sacrificing this essential characteristic, the association must adapt itself to the us-
ages of trade. The merchant who, buys its products, the banker who lends it money,
properly insist that there be a responsible legal entity with which dealings can be
had, that the property contributed by the members be subjected to the hazards of
the venture in which it has been launched, that the officers of the association have
the powers normal in the conduct of trade, and that no secret and unusual restric-
tions hamper their authority in ordinary 'business transactions. By conferring on
the association legal title with the powers of disposition which are incident to le-
gal title the members have successfully achieved these results. By insisting that
this legal title exists for a special and limited purpose, for the benefit only of those
who deal with the association in good faith and in the normal course of business,
the rights of the members as the real parties in interest are preserved. Thus the
corporate entity, that useful legal mechanism, has served once more to effect a
practical adjustment between the interests of a group and the habits and customs
of society." Henderson, Co-operative Marketing Associations, 23 CoL. L. Rav. 91
(1923).
13 Dairy Products Association v. National Cheese Producers' Federation, 217
Wis. 202, 257 N.W. 624, 98 A.L.R. 1403 (1934), supra note 1o.
NOTES
issue-that is, the feasibility of co-operatives, a governmentally privi-
leged group, existing in American business. The issue reduces itself to
an acceptance in some degree of economic planning or a return to laissez-
faire capitalism.
This issue, of course, is not peculiar to co-operatives; rather it per-
meates the very structure of any government as far as- economic policy
is concerned.
When laissez-faire capitalism was the economic policy of the United
States, farmers suffered a very meager compensation for their produc-
tive activity. At the same time there existed a great gap between the
payment the farmer received and the cost the consumer expended for
the product. The government recognized that the largest portion of the
selling price of agricultural products was going to the middleman rather
than to the farmer producer. Co-operatives were sanctioned by the gov-
ernment in an effort to alleviate this apparent injustice. True, this devi-
ated from the uncontrolled free enterprise theory of business, but gov-
ernment felt that laissez-faire capitalism had failed to bring economic
justice to the farmer and that some positive governmental action would
be necessary to correct the injustice. Thus this co-operative type of gov-
ernment planning became a part of our economy.
Co-operatives have expanded because they have aided the farmer and
because other groups have seen how the principle of co-operation tends
to narrow the distribution of wealth more to those who are active in its
production. The co-operative expansion has been at the expense of the
middleman and the speculator.14 These are the groups now which are
activating the opposition to the co-operatives. They are of the group
that prefer a world in which a free hand is given to the strong and the
clever. This group holds that a free struggle makes for strong, vigor-
ous character and that large inequalities are necessary to support the
economic incentives. The group which supports co-operatives holds that
the strong have a decided obligation to society and stresses the solida-
rity of human interest. This group dislikes and doubts the wisdom of
great inequalities.
The laissez-faire capitalist states that the acceptance of co-opera-
tives opens the door to either socialism or communism. Supporters of
planning in. government answer that the member of a co-operative is
just as much an individual as any other producer in the free enterprise
14 "The main reason why co-operatives are disliked in some quarters is that
they cut out the middleman and the speculators. The farmer is at a natural disad-
vantage and the only way he can gain an equality of bargaining power in the
market place is to form co-operatives." NEw REPuBLIc, September 8, 1947, p.
32-33.
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system.' 5 He benefits only to the extent to which he produces but he
claims rewards from the co-operative system because he is assured of a
more equitable distribution of the final sale price because of his en-
hanced co-operative bargaining position. The planning, states the sup-
porter of co-operatives, is exercised to correct the past inequity of dis-
tribution in which a parasitic middleman who contributed nothing
reaped handsome harvests through speculation.
As a result of the alleged failure of laissez-faire capitalism in pro-
viding for a just and equitable distribution of its concededly tremendous
production of material goods, we see many humanitarians clamoring
for correction of this purported abuse in the free enterprise system.
They feel that for production to be progressive, it must benefit society
at large and especially those who assist in the production. This benefit
to society, they hold, must be proportionate to the scope of the produc-
tion, thus demanding an equitable distribution of wealth.
There is a just order in society. It is the role of government to guar-
antee the public well being and private prosperity, so that the material
benefits of the earth may fill the needs of all its inhabitants. Organizing
to bring about this commutative justice is a natural right. The guiding
principle of economic life and of this organizing should be social justice
and social charity.16 Co-operatives, thd progressives hold, are one of the
forces attempting to correct the distribution evils of laissez-faire capital-
ism. 17 This is the present situation, as the forces for and against co-
operatives spar in the American economic ring.
This is an election year, however, and two-thirds of the farmers are
members of co-operatives. Therefore it is extremely doubtful that the
present Congress will derogate from the power of co-operatives and thus
incur the ire of such a powerful voting bloc, even though the economic
philosophy of the present Congress might dictate otherwise.
Thomas F. Broden.
15 See address of Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture, delivered at a
special meeting of farmers and representatives of farmers co-operatives of Wash-
ington, Oregon and Idaho held at Everett, Washington, Dec. 11, 1947. This speech
is printed in VITAL SPE.Ecns, January 15, 1948, p.220.
1G THE CONDITION OF LABOR, Pope Leo XIII: RECONSTRUCTION OF THE So-
0AL ORDz, Pope Pius XI.
17 TnE C usrw~ CmETURy, April 23, 1947, p. 516. On the appointment of
Jerry Voorhis, former California congressman to the head executive post of the Co-
operative League, the Christian Century said, ". . . Mr. Voorhis takes over at a
strategic moment. Millions of Americans believe that laissez-faire capitalism is on
its last legs, and are looking for some alternative other than state ownership and
control. The co-operatives say they have the alternative . . ."
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LABOR LAW-COMMENT ON THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, TITLE II.-
Senator Taft, in a recent magazine article said, "Little attention has
been given to that portion of the act establishing an independent Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service." 1 He was referring to Title
II of the statute which presumes to make available a Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service to labor-management disputants. It also pre
sents something of a plan for dealing with a threatened strike or lock-
out approaching a national emergency.
The new Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, called "Serv-
ice" in the Act, was removed from the Department of Labor to an in-
dependent status because, in the words of Senator Taft, "Since the De-
partment of Labor was expressly created to advance the cause of
unions, conciliators coming from that department were frequently han-
dicapped by the belief on the part of employers that they would not
act impartially."' 2
The Service is under the direction of a Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Director, called "Director" in the Act. The office is filled by
appointment by the President by and with the consent of the Senate.
Mr. Cyrus S. Ching today fills that position. The Director 'is authorized
to establish the principal office in the District of Columbia and such
regional offices as his judgment might consider necessary. The Direc-
tor is permitted to delegate any or all authority and discretion conferred
upon him by the Act to regional directors or other subordinates. He is
encouraged to cooperate with state and local mediation agencies. Con-
gress asks of him a written report at the end of each fiscal year. Pre-
vious mediation and conciliation functions of the Department of Labor
and the United States Conciliation Service were transferred to the new
department with a specific legislative declaration of independence of
jurisdiction and authority for the newly created Service.
The Service is to prevent or minimize interruptions in the flow of
commerce which grow from labor disputes. Mediation and conciliation
services are to be available upon call from either of the parties to a la-
bor dispute or upon a decision of the Service officials that the labor dis-
pute thieatens to cause a substantial interruption of commerce. If the
Service activates its own facilities, it must contact both parties and
exert its best efforts to bring agreement through mediation and con-
ciliation.3 If the Service's "best efforts" are unavailing within a reason-
able time, it shall seek by "other means", including submission to the
employees by secret ballot the employer's last offer of settlement, to
1 Collier's, March 6, 1948, p.39.
2 Ibd., p.42
3 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. 144, 203
(a) (b).
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avoid a strike, lockout, or other coercion. Rejection by either party of
procedure suggested by the Director is not a violation of the Act.4
Section 204 directs disputants to meet in collective bargaining and
to participate in meetings undertaken by the Service, but it attaches no
penalty for failure or refusal to do so.
Provisions are made for the establishment of a twelve-man National
Labor-Management Panel to be appointed by the President. Six mem-
bers are to come from the field of management and six from labor. The
stated purpose of the panel is to advise at the request of the Director
in the avoidance of industrial controversies as, well as the desirable
manner of administering mediation and arbitration, especially "with
reference to controversies affecting the general welfare of the country."
Much constructive study aiming toward the development of labor
statesmanship might be pursued if this group were formed with care
and permitted to act beyond the borders of its stated purpose.
When, in the opinion of the President, a threatened strike or lock-
out imperils the national health or safety, he may appoint a special
board of inquiry. This special board of inquiry shall have a chairman
and such other members as the President determines. It shall have
power to compel attendance of witnesses and to compel production of
books, papers, and documents. After inquiry into the issue of the dis-
pute, the board shall make a full written report to the President re-
vealing each party's statement of its position. The President shall then
file a copy of such report with the Service and make its contents avail-
able to the public. After receiving the report from the board of inquiry,
the President may direct the Attorney General to petition any United
States District Court having jurisdiction of the parties to enjoin such
strike or lock-out, if the court finds the threatened strike or lock-out
is likely to affect "an entire industry or substantial part thereof" or
imperil the national health or safety. Such court injunctions are subject
to appellate review by appropriate Circuit Court of Appeals or by the
Supreme Court. Section 208 (b) has caused and will cause much ques-
tioning. It reinstates a limited use of the injunction in labor disputes of
a given magnitude. Perhaps Congress felt that delaying tactics plus in-
vestigation and publication of issues would serve to eradicate or elim-
inate severe strikes or lock-outs. Some anti-labor employers might see
a strike-breaking tool in the injunction. Impartial observers might won-
der why the injunction would be resurrected in preference to compul-
sory arbitration by a-board appointed by the President. How otherwise
can settlement machinery go to the merits of a bona fide dispute im-
periling the national health and safety to resolve it equitably for labor,
management, and the general public? Has the shadow of John L. Lewis
4 Ibid., 203 (c)
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clouded legislative thinking? Labor injunctions ring with historical
overtones which many Americans would like to forget. When such an
injunction is issued,
. . . it shall be the duty of the parties to the dispute giving
rise to such order to make every effort to adjust and settle
their differences, with the assistance of the Service created by
this act. Neither party shall be under any duty to accept, in
whole or in part, any proposal of settlement made by the Serv-
ice.5
Upon the issuance of the injunction, the President must reconvene
the board of inquiry to reinvestigate and report again at the end of a
sixty day period the current position of the parties and the efforts made
toward settlement, as well as the employer's last offer of settlement.
The President shall-make that report public. Within the following fif-
teen days, the National Labor Relations Board shall determine by se-
cret ballot whether the employees wish to accept the employer's final of-
fer of settlement. The Board shall report the results of the voting to
the Attorney General within five days after their determination. Upon
certification of the results of the ballot or upon a settlement being
reached, whichever happens sooner, the Attorney General shall move the
court to discharge the injunction. When such a motion is granted and
the injunction is discharged, the President shall make a comprehensive
report of the whole dispute to Congress together with his recommenda-
tions. It is possible that Congress would then enact legislation compell-
ing submission to a board of arbitration whose decision would be final
and binding on both parties. Congress has, to date, shown a reluctance
to consider this step.
Section 211 establishes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics and in the
Department of Labor a file of copies of collective bargaining agreements
and similar material useful in settling disputes. All except confidential
material shall be available to the Service, employers, employees, or their
representatives.
Section 212 exempts all matter subject to the Railway Labor Act
from the provisions of Title II of the Taft-Hartley Act.
President Truman, in his veto message, had criticism for Section 208
of the bill. He felt that the elaborate procedure, the approximately
eighty days' waiting period and the secret ballot on the employer's last
offer reflected either improper planning or misunderstanding. Since the
board of inquiry is "specifically forbidden to offer its informed judg-
ment concerning a reasonable basis for settlement of the dispute," its
5 An Assocated Press release from Washington dated March 6, 1948, quoted
Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wis.) as demanding compulsory arbitration to settle
labor disputes in all atomic energy plants.
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function would serve only "to dramatize the respective positions of the
parties". Fact-finding should precede, not succeed, a breakdown of la-
bor relations. Experiences with the War Labor Disputes Act have shown
that most secret ballots sustain the bargaining representatives as votes
of confidence. After the elaborate procedure "it would be mandatory
for the President to transfer the whole problem to the Congress even if
it were not in session." Thus a major economic dispute would enter the
political arena. "One could scarcely devise a less effective method for
discouraging critical strikes."
This entire procedure is based upon the same erroneous as-
sumptions as those which underlay the strike-vote provision
of the War Labor Disputes Act, namely, that strikes are called
in haste as the result of inflamed passions, and that union
leaders do not represent the wishes of the workers. We have
learned by experience, however, that strikes in the basic in-
dustries are not called in haste, but only after long periods of
negotiation and serious deliberation; and that in the secret-
ballot election the workers almost always vote to support their
leaders.
Furthermore, a fundamental inequity runs through these
provisions. The bill provides for injunctions to prohibit work-
ers from striking, even against terms dictated by employers
after contracts have expired. There is no provision assuring the
protection of the rights of the employees during 'the period
they are deprived of the right to protect themselves by eco-
nomic action (italics supplied).6
However imperfect -the Act may be and however prejudice may have
prompted some of its features, it can be hoped that fair administration
by a new organization can overcome many defects. Already the five man
board and federal judges are accepting their duties under the Act with
wisdom and fairness. 7
On August 1, 1947, when the newly created National Labor Rela-
tions Board of Chairman Paul M. Herzog, John M. Huston, James J.
Reynolds, Jr., Abe Murdock, and J. Copeland Gray was formed, it
joined General Counsel Robert N. Denham in the following statement: 8
We start upon our new tasks with deep determination. We
have pledged to ourselves and to each other, to administer the
new law with all the diligence and fair-mindedness in our
power.
6 Labor Management Relations Act Veto Message, U. S. CoDE CoNo. SEav-
icE, 1851, (80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.)
7 Denham, The Taft-Hartley Act, 20 TENN. L. Rxv. 168 (1948).
8 Release of National Labor Relations Board, August 1, 1947.
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We accept the trust of our new positions with intent to do
our utmost to make every provision of the law work as effec-
tively as possible. As members of the Executive Branch of
the Government we repeat our srgle-minded purpose to carry
out the congressional intent as provided in the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947.
To the employers and employees of the Nation our mes-
sage is simply this: At this time, as at all others, labor and
management will serve their mutual welfare best by working
together with full recognition by each of the legitimate rights
of the other. And, equally important, they must at all times be
sensitive to the needs and rights of the public.
Beyond this, in the words of the Chief Executive:
Insofar as management and labor are concerned, there is a
vital responsibility upon them to comply with the law in a
spirit of tolerance and fair play. Neither- management nor la-
bor will achieve any' long-range benefit by seeking to use the
provisions of this act to gain unfair advantage or to sustain ar-
bitrary attitudes. It is in the interest of both to maintain
steady production at fair wages while the effect of the new
act is being tested by experience.
It is of interest to note that three thousand eight petitions were
filed before the board during the month of January, 1948. Two thou-
sand six hundred eighty-five petitions were for various types of elec-
tions. Two hundred fifty-two petitions alleged unfair labor practices by
employers. Seventy-one petitions alleged unfair labor practices by
,unions. The nation observes closely the administration of the Act. 9
Robert F. Burns.
UNITED STATES-CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONs.-The investiga-
tion of the Hollywood film industry by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities has recently evoked throughout the nation a clamor
of protest in which the squeals of Communists whose toes had been
stepped on mingled with the cries of leading jurists and lawyers whose
legal sensibilities had been wounded by the high-handed procedural
methods of the Thomas Committee. Whether any unjust charges were
made, or any innocent citizens were prejudiced as a result of the inves-
9 Title I of the Act is discussed in 23 No=E DA im LAWYER 238 (1948). The
NomE DA= LAWYER anticipates the publication of additional articles as decisions
and rulings mark a trend.
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tigation, the fact remains that in many instances the proceedings vio-
lated the fundamental Anglo-American principles of fair procedure and
the spirit of the Constitution, not to mention natural justice.
Persons against whom accusations of Communism were made in
public hearing were denied the right to cross-examine their accusers.
Many of the charges were unsupported by concrete evidence, and no
evidence was allowed to show their falsity. Persons were asked to testify
as to their political affiliations, and, refusing to do so, were cited for
contempt of Congress. Thus, a blight was cast upon the reputations of
persons who, innocent or not, will have difficulty cleansing their name
from the Communist taint for a long time to come. An ironic note is
added when one considers that all this was done in the name of the
Congress of the United States for the purpose of investigating un-
American activities.
It seems clear that the committee was acting within Constitutional
limits;' at least it is extremely doubtful that the Supreme Court of the
United States will declare unconstitutional either the actions of the
Committee or the House resolution 2 which created it. The power to
investigate, carrying with it the ability to summon witnesses and pun-
ish them for contumacy, has been considered a necessary adjunct to leg-
islative power since the -early days of the British Parliament. Typical
of the many committees of inquiry created by the House of Commons
in the tumultuous period immediately following the Revolution of 1688
was the one authorized to investigate "Miscarriages in the Victualling
in the Navy".3 Lord Coleridge in 1845 4 quoted with approval Lord
Coke's statement that the Commons were the "general inquisitors of the
realm" and added that "Coextensive with the jurisdiction to inquire
must be their authority to call for the attendance of witnesses, to en-
force it by arrest when disobedience makes that necessary . . ." While
the investigatory function of Congress is by no means as broad as that
of its British counterpart, it is considered implicit in its grant of legisla-
tive power that Congress should be able to obtain information upon any
matter which might become the subject of a law. The power to inves-
tigate is at least as great as the power to legislate, and is probably nec-
essarily greater. 5 That this power must be implemented by demanding
the testimony of witnesses and punishing them if they prove recalci-
trant is obviously necessary to its existence. That was decided in 1897
in the case of In re Chapman.6 The Supreme Court upheld the power
1 United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D. D.C. 1947).
2 H. Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CoNG. RzEc. 10, 15 (1945).
3 5 HANSARD, PARL. HIST. ENG. 282 (1689).
4 Howard v. Gossett, 10 Q.B. 359, 116 Eng. Rep. 139 (1845).
5 See: United States v. Josephson, 165 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 2nd 1947).
6 166 U. S. 661, 17 S. Ct. 677, 41 L. Ed. 1154 (1897).
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of Congress to make criminal the contumacy of a witness called to in-
vestigate charges of corruption of members of Congress.
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,7 decided in 1880, the Supreme Court de-
limited the investigatory power of the legislature when it held for the
plaintiff in an action for false imprisonment against the Sergeant-at-
Arms of the House of Representatives, who had jailed the plaintiff for
refusing to testify before a House Committee investigating the bank-
ruptcy of a debtor of the United States. Justice Miller said:
We are sure that no person can be punished for contumacy
as a witness before either House unless his testimony is re-
quired in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to
inquire, and we feel equally sure that neither of these bodies
possesses the general power of making inquiry into the private
affairs of citizens.
This decision has been criticised as too narrowly confining the
limits of congressional activity." Later cases 9 have allowed greater lati-
tude to Congress, and the present trend is to uphold the legitimacy of
the inquiry, even where there is only a remote possibility of congression-
al action by legislation.' 0 This policy was followed as lately as Feb-
ruary, 1948, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Sec~nd
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Josephson." The appellant
was summoned as a witness before the Sub-Committee of the Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities. He appeared, but refused to answer any
questions or be sworn until he had "an opportunity to determine
through the courts the legality of this committee". He was convicted
on an indictment based on 2 U.S.C.A. § 192,12 which declares a refusal
to appear, or to answer any question pertinent to the question under in-
quiry to be a misdemeanor. The Court of Appeals 13 put down Joseph-
son's objections to the measure, declaring that they could not presume
that Congress would abuse its power, and that the possibility of such
abuse was not grounds for holding that the power did not exist.
The authority, then, of the Committee is incontestable. Equally
impregnable to attack on purely constitutional grounds is its activity
7 103 U. S. 168, 11 D. C. 401, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880).
8 The court in United States v. Josephson intimated that had it been neces-
sary for the decision, it would have examined the Kilbourn case with some doubt
as to its avowed limitations upon Congressional investigations. 165 F. (2d) 82, 8z
(1947).
9 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580 (1927);
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 49 S. Ct. 268, 73 L. Ed. 692 (1929).
10 Barry v. United States ex rel Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597, 49 S. Ct. 452,
73 L. Ed. 867 (1929).
11 .... U. S .... (decided February, 1948).
12 52 STAT. 942, 2 U. S. C. A. § 192 (1938).
I3 165 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 2nd 1947).
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in last October's hearings, for the time-honored procedural safeguards
which antedate and are assured by our Constitution apply only to crim-
inal proceedings. 14  It is no crime to be a Communist. Therefore, a
man who is accused of Communism cannot demand the right to cross-
examine his accuser, or the right to be immune from testifying against
himself. Nevertheless, linking a man's name with Communism stigma-
tizes him far more effectively than would conviction of a minor crime.
15
Thus it becomes important that if rights of reputation are to be protect-
ed in Congressional hearings as well as in the criminal courts, procedural
safeguards must be adopted by Congress itself to be used in investiga-
tions in which a man's good name is at stake. This need has been rec-
oguized by members of Congress who realize that that body has lost
the confidence and respect of many citizens as a result of the inquisitor-
ial tone of the hearings. Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas, of
California, felt strongly enough about the situation to introduce a bill
in the House of Representatives providing for regular procedure to pre-
vent further abuses. 6
Mrs. Douglas's proposed enactment is divided into three sections.
The first is a declaration of policy, to the effect that these committees
and sub-committees should conduct their proceedings not as forums for
making unsupportable charges detrimental to the persons involved, but
in a manner calculated to be fair to all who may be affected thereby.
Section two implements this policy. Paragraph (a) would assure wit-
nesses at committee hearings the right to aid of counsel and to have "a
full and fair presentation of the matter under investigation." Para-
graph (b) provides that after every vitness in a hearing has testified,
he shall have the right to make either an oral statement, or, if he
choose, to file a sworn statement relevant to the subject, which shall be
made part of the record. Paragraph (c) is the core of the bill:
(c) If a committee or any member thereof shall make pub-
lic any report furnished to it by its staff or others, or if any
witness shall make, by oral testimony or documentary evi-
dence, any statement reflecting adversely upon the character
or reputation of any other person (including governmental
officials or employees) the committee shall either at once strike
such material from the record or shall grant to the person re-
ferred to an opportunity to cross-examine the person responsi-
ble for the report or making the statement, and to present
countervailing evidence. Such cross-examination and evidence
14 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906).
15 Loss of employment could conceivably work as a bill of pains and penal-
ties included within the prohibition against bills of attainder. See: United States
v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946).
10 H. R. 4564, Both Cong., 1st Sess., November 24, 1947.
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shall be relevant to the interests of the individual who is in-
volved, and may be subject to such reasonable limits of time
amd duration as the committee may impose. In addition, the
persons concerned shall have the right, but unless subpoenaed
shall have no obligation, to file with the committee any denial,
defense, or explanation they may see fit and they shall have
the right to testify in person.
Section three of the bill would secure members of the press from being
compelled to answer for any adverse criticism of Congress or its mem-
bers, before a Congressional committee, unless his testimony be deemed
essential "upon vote of a majority of the committee or subcommittee be-
fore whom he is called to testify: Provided, That no person shall be
called before any committee or subcommittee having less than five mem-
bers."
The provisions of the bill are nothing more than obvious concessions
to fair play; certainly they are not more stringent than the occasion de-
mands.17 Neither can it be said that they would in any way hamper
Congress in its quest for the information necessary t6 its function. The
lamentable fact is that such measures have been so forcibly shown to be
necessary. To merely give to the person whose reputation has been un-
justly damaged a recourse to the courts may be merely an attempt to
lock the barn door after the horse has been stolen. Certainly, the adop-
tion of these or similar procedural safeguards would do much to restore
the prestige of congressional investigations.
F. H. Hicks
INTERSTATE COMMERcE-THE NATURAL GAS AcT-DIRECT SALES
To ULTiATE CoNsumERs.-The odious burden of regulation has led
many companies engaged in interstate commerce into the courts in
search of a "twilight zone" between state and federal jurisdiction. In
one field, at least, such an hiatus seems now nonexistent. As Mr. Jus-
tice Rutledge said in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. Public
Service Commission of Indiana et al.,' in ruling that Congress intended
by the Natural Gas Act 2 that the states were to control direct sales to
17 For a good discussion of the constitutional aspects of the problem, see
Note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 (1947). A penetrating analysis of the sometimes in-
quisitorial techniques of the Thomas Committee on Un-American Activities will be
found in Walter Gellhorn's stimulating article: Gellhorn, Report on a Report of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 60 Hbmv. L. Ray. 1193 (1947).
1 ..... S...., 68 S. Ct. 190, 92 L. Ed. 173 (1947).
2 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. A. § 717 et seq. (1938).
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industrial consumers, "The attractive gap which appellant has envision-
ed in the coordinate schemes of regulation is a mirage."
The "mirage" which Panhandle Eastern saw looks very real at first
glance. The Public Service Commission of Indiana had ordered Pan-
handle Eastern to file its tariffs and reports for purposes of regulating
its direct sales to ultimate consumers in Indiana. The pipe line com-
pany replied by seeking an injunction to set aside and enjoin the en-
forcement of the commission's order. The specific sale in question was
one made by Panhandle Eastern direct to the Anchor-Hocking Glass
Corporation. The trial judge granted the injunction, but the order was
reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court.8 Though sales of this type
have been held to be interstate in character,4 Congress, through the
Natural Gas Act, expressly exempted them from federal jurisdiction.
Congress cannot grant to the states control over interstate commerce,
since that would be equivalent to a delegation of legislative power, but
Congress can allow the states to regulate -interstate commerce not then
regulated by the federal government. The problem presented for de-
cision in this case was, therefore, twofold. Did Congress by prohibiting
the exercise of federal jurisdiction over these sales, intend to deliver
them to state control? In the absence of such intent, were the local inter-
ests of the state so vital as to allow the state to operate in an area which
the federal government had not occupied? In answering these ques-
tions in favor of state control the Court did not have to go far beyond
precedent. Control of such direct sales, when made to both industrial
and domestic consumers, had previously been held to be of such a local
character as to justify state regulation, in the absence of Congressional
action.5 It was not necessary to rely on that, however, since it was
clear from the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Natural
Gas Act that it was the intent of Congress that the federal government
should only regulate those sales which the Supreme Court had held to
be beyond the regulatory power of the states.0 It was equally clear
3 ---- Ind ...... 71 N. E. (2d) 117 (1947).
4 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 38 S. Ct. 438, 62
L. Ed. 1006 (1918); Haskel v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U. S. 217, 32 S. Ct.
442, 56 L. Ed. 738 (1912); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 31 S.
Ct. 564, 55 L. Ed. 716 (1911). Sales to local public utilities for resale have been
held to be in interstate commerce until the gas enters the service pipes of the util-
ity. Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 S. Ct. 268, 63 L.
Ed. 577 (1919).
5 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 U. S. 23, 40 S. Ct. 279,
64 L. Ed. 434 (1920).
G Public Utilities Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47
S. Ct. 294, 71 L. Ed. 549 (1927); State of Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
265 U. S. 298, 44 S. Ct. 544, 68 L. Ed. 1027 (1924). These cases declared invalid
state laws regulating sales to local distributing companies for resale.
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that Congress intended that the natural gas industry be subject to
regulation. As the Court said: 7
The scheme was one of cooperative action between federal
and state agencies. It could accomplish neither that protective
aim nor the comprehensive and effective dual regulation Con-
gress had in mind, if those companies could divert at will all
or the cream of their business to unregulated industrial uses.
The bare question of the power of the State to regulate such direct
sales seem, then, irrefutably answered. Mr. Justice Rutledge knew,
however, that the problem had not been solved by that answer alone.
When counsel for the pipe line company expressed concern that such
state regulation would result in impeding the free flow of commerce, he
answered: 8
State power to regulate interstate commerce, wherever it
exists, is not the power to destroy it, unless Congress has ex-
pressly so provided. It is the power to require that it be done
on terms reasonably related to the necessity for protecting
local interests on which the power rests.
Thus, the power of the states to regulate this commerce seems clearly
limited. In examining the facts further, however, some doubt arises
as to the meaning of this passage.
The sale which Panhandle Eastern made to Anch6r-Hocking is typ-
ical of direct sales. The pipe line company and the factory enter into
an agreement whereby gas is piped direct from the main pipe line to the
factory. The factory, which up to then probably bought its natural
gas from the local public utility, now becomes a customer of the pipe
line company. Assuming that this sale is unregulated, the pipe line
company may then determine its price on a competitive fuel basis. This
is the danger of which the Public Service Commission complained. Yet,
whether the sale to the factory be regulated or unregulated, the pipe
line company cannot charge a price higher than that charged by the
regulated public utility, since the factory would then, of course, resume
dealings with the public utility. Thus, regardless of the monopolistic
character of the natural gas industry, the factory owner is not put in an
inferior bargaining position. On the contrary, he can probably get a
much cheaper rate from the pipe line company as an inducement to deal
with him. The only benefit he would receive from regulation would be
the assurance that the pipe line company could not give undue advant-
age to his competitors. Thus, all the pipe line company and the factory
owner are doing is dividing the difference between the respective costs
7 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Indiana, note
1 supra, 68 S. Ct. 190, 197.
s Id. at 198.
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of the pipe line company and the public utility. The public utility com-
pany is not the only loser in this transaction, however. Ultimately, it
is the consumer dealing with the public utility who pays the difference,
as is illustrated by this footnote to Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in
the Panhandle Eastern Case: 9
Over 38 per cent of the gross revenues of the local Indiana
utilities from the sale of gas is derived from service to the ap-
proximately 250 industrial consumers served by them. If serv-
ice to any substantial number of the industrial users were to be
taken over by appellant, the local utilities not only would suffer
great losses in revenue, but would be unable to dispense with
more than a trivial percentage of their present properties.
The resultant increase in unit cost of gas would lead necessar-
ily to increased rates for the consumers served by the local
companies. (italics supplied).
In other words, if this trend toward direct sales to industrial consumers
is allowed to continue, the unit costs of the public utilities will rise con-
siderably, to the detriment of its customers. The interest of the state
regulatory commission is not in uniform regulation, but in keeping utili-
ty rates as low as is consistent with sound business practice. To spell
it out more simply, the state commission's interest is in discouraging, if
not entirely prohibiting, these sales, and not in merely regulating them.
A recent case decided in a Circuit Court of Michigan l0 illustrates
the problem. There, the Michigan Public Service Commission prohib-
ited a sale by the same Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company to the
Ford Motor Company. Panhandle sought an injunction to restrain
the Commission from interfering with its contractual relations with
Ford, which relief was granted. The court agreed that the sale was in
interstate commerce, yet subject to state regulation, but denied that such
power of regulation gave the power to prohibit direct sales entirely.
The court relied on authority denying the state's power to "seriously
interfere" with interstate commerce."1 Although this case was decided
before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the aforemen-
tioned Panhandle Eastern case, it is difficult to see that the judge's
ruling would be any different today. The Supreme Court's dictum
that the power to regulate is not the power to destroy, unless expressly
provided by Congress, could only serve to buttress the authority which
9 Id. at 197.
10 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Comm.,
Circuit Court of Ingham County, October 5, 1946.
11 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed.
1915 (1945). An intervener, the Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, complained
that if this sale were allowed, the company would sustain a loss in gross revenue
of $1,600,000 a year. The court felt that this was a matter for Congress to con-
sider.
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the court then had at its command. Yet, can the Supreme Court's de-
cision be given this interpretation when the vital local interests which
the Court deemed paramount, can only be protected by prohibiting, or
at least discouraging, such sales? To answer this question, it is neces-
sary to look further into the meaning given the Natural Gas Act by the
Supreme Court.
The Court likened the Natural Gas Act to the McCarran Act,' 2
which defines the limits of state power over insurance. In interpreting
the McCarran Act in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,1S the Su-
preme Court held that, in allowing the states to tax interstate insurance
companies, Congress had permitted them to levy discriminatory
taxes.14 In levying discriminatory taxes, states place a very definite
burden on interstate commerce.' 5 Moreover, discriminatory taxation
could accomplish the same purpose as prohibitory regulation. It would
be dangerous, however, to take Mr. Justice Rutledge's identification of
the Natural Gas Act and the McCarran Act too literally. It seems clear
from his opinion that he felt that any grave danger to interstate com-
merce occasioned by the Court's construction of the Natural Gas Act
was dispelled by reaffirming the states' lack of power to destroy, in the
absence of express permission of Congress. This would, of course, imply
that the Court felt that the Natural Gas Act does not give this permis-
sion. This brings us, then, squarely to the problem. If the above ex-
planation of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Natural Gas Act
is to be accepted, the states have not, by -this act, been permitted to
destroy interstate commerce. The vital local interests which the Court
has thus far been careful to protect, demand, however, that these sales
be prohibited. The situation takes on all the aspects of a dilemma.
Perhaps the solution lies in Congressional action. In hearings held
in April of last year, before the final determination of the Panhandle
Eastern case, John E. Benton, representing the National Association
of Railroad and Utility Commissioners, recommended that Section One
of the Natural Gas Act be amended to conform substantially with Sec-
tions One and Two of the McCarran Act.16 Though this measure was
12 -59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1011 et seq. (1945).
13 -328 U. S. 408, 66 S. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342 (1946).
14 "We assume that the tax would be discriminatory in the sense of Pruden-
tial's contention.' Id., 328 U. S. at 429.
15 Chief justice Stone, in declaring a state tax discriminatory, said: "The
vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid is that they have placer
on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable, in point of substance
of being imposed or added to with equal right by every state which the com-
merce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done, so that without
the protection of the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not im-
posed on local commerce." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S.
250, 255, 58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. Ed. 823 (1938).
13 The proposed amendments would not have made any change in federal
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never carried to a'vote,17 in all probability future legislation will take
substantially the same form. If that is the case, it would not be diffi-
cult for the Supreme Court to construe the Act as allowing State Com-
missions to prohibit direct sales. Authority for such action has been
held by the Court to have been given in construing statutes in other
fields of interstate commerce. Congress has, at times, withdrawn from
certain fields of interstate commerce in order to leave the states free
to prohibit it. This has happened in the case of liquor,'8 oleomarga-
rine,19 and convict-made goods, 20 and in each case the laws have been
upheld.21 In none of these, however, was an express statement of pow-
er to prohibit felt necessary. 22 A case clearly analogous to the situation
stated here is that of Vance v. Vandercook,23 in which the Supreme
Court upheld the power of the state to prohibit interstate commerce
where Congress had given power to regulate under the Wilson Act.24
Perhaps the Supreme Court can protect these local interests without
waiting for Congress to act. The cases cited by the Supreme Court 25
jurisdiction, but would only have strengthened the states' control over what they
already have power to regulate. They provided that "silence on the part of
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to such regulation by state
authority.", and that those parts of the business not controlled by the federal
government are "declared to be local in character, and shall continue to be sub-
ject to regulation under the laws of the several states, and such regulation shall
not be held to be a burden on interstate or foreign commerce." Hearings before
Committee on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569 and H.R. 2956, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 641.
17 The history of these amendments has been extensively reviewed earlier in
the NoTRE Dam_ LAwvmR. Scanlon, Administrative Abnegation in the Face of
Congressional Coercion: The Interstate Gas Company Affair (1948) 23 NoTRE
DAss LAwYER 173.
18 26 Stat. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. § 121 (1890) (Wilson Act); 49 Stat. 877, 27
U. S. C. A. § 122 (1913) (Webb-Kenyon Act).
19 32 Stat. 193, 21 U. S. C. A. § 25 (1902).
20 45 Stat. 1084, 49 U. S. C. A. § 60 (1929) (Hawes-Cooper Act); 49 Stat.
494, 18 U. S. C. A. § 396b-e (1935) (Ashurst-Sumners Act).
21 In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 S. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572 (1891) (Wilson
Act); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. Ct. 180, 61 L.
Ed. 326 (1917) (Webb-Kenyon Act); United States v. Green, 137 Fed. 179 (1905)
(oleomargarine); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 299 U. S.
334, 57 S. Ct. 277, 81 L. Ed. 270 (1937) (convict-made goods statutes).
22 The Wilson Act provides that liquors transported into a State shall "be sub-
ject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State . . ." An act passed in
1902 regulating the sale of oleomargarine had substantially the same provision, as
does the Hawes-Cooper Act. The Webb-Kenyon Act and the Ashurst-Sumners
Act made it unlawful to import "in violation of any law of such State . . ." see
note 16, supra.
23 170 U. S. 438, 18 S. Ct. 674, 42 L. Ed. 1100 (1898).
24 26 Stat. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. § 121 (1890).
25 United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1940);
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., Clark Distilling Co. v. West-
ern Md. Ry., both supra note 18.
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in support of the state's lack of power to destroy interstate commerce, in
the absence of the approval of Congress, differ from this situation in one
important respect. In those cases, interstate commerce had been di-
rectly prohibited, e. g. liquor.26 In the factual situation presented to
the Michigan Circuit judge,. the pipe line company was not prevented
from selling its gas within the state, it was merely told to whom it could
sell. True, such an instruction involved a prohibition of interstate
commerce, but a very logical distinction can be made between the sort
of obstruction of commerce which the commerce clause was designed to
prevent, and prohibition as an aspect of valid regulatory powers. As
one court expressed it, in speaking of federal power, over interstate com-
merce: 27
In other words, although the power over interstate transpor-
tation was to regulate, that could only be accomplished by
prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to
effect the evils intended.
By weighing the local and national interests involved, a workable and
well-known test is provided for determining whether particular prohib-
itory state statutes destroy, or merely regulate, interstate commerce.
As the Court itself said, such regulation must "be done on terms reas-
onably related to the necessity for protecting local interests on which
the power rests." 28 That the Supreme Court has this power over state
statutes is well recognized.2 9 To the argument that this unduly widens
the discretionary power of the Supreme Court, there is the answer of
the long history of decisions where this power has been logically and
effectively used.8 0 It would be presumption, however, to say that this
is the real construction which the Supreme Court placed on the Natural
Gas Act. It is still difficult to avoid the fact that the Court answered
the appellant's fears that its commerce would be impeded by defining
the states' power to destroy. One thing, at least, is certain. The prob-
lem cannot be avoided. The trend toward this type of sale can only
result in restrictive and prohibitory regulation by the states. Perhaps
the resultant litigation will produce a clearer definition of the limits of
state power on the natural gas industry.
John H. O'Hara
26 In re Rahrer; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., both supra, note 18.
27 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101
(1918).
28 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Indiana, note
1 supra, 68 S. Ct. 190, 198.
29 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed.
1915 (1945).
80 An analysis of the cases on the Supreme Court as the arbiter of State
laws can be found in a recent article by N. T. Dowling. Dowling, Interstate Com-
merce and State Power-Revised Version (1947) 47 CoL. L. REv. 547.
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MARRIAGE-CONTRACEPTION AS A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT ON THE
BASIS OF FRAUD.-The English House of Lords has recently caused
much comment and controversy both in the United States and in Eng-
land by a decision relating to an interpretation of the primary purpose
of matrimony. In the decision, in the case of Baxter v. Baxter,' Eng-
land's highest court decided that a husband, who had been married ten
years, was not entitled to an annulment of the marriage on the grounds
of non consummation because his wife insisted on the use of contracep-
tives and would not have intercourse with him unless he used adequate
means to avoid conception.
The case was notable, not so much for the decision itself, which
seems to reiterate much which has already at least been implied in
American law, but for the statements regarding the primary purpose of
matrimony. The House of Lords seems to be of the opinion that the
procreation of children is not the primary end of matrimony; that it is
only one of the results to be achieved by marriage, and that, in this
enlightened day, it is not essential.
This erroneous enunciation of the primary purpose of marriage
necessarily caused much adverse comment; it focuses attention on the
small, but rapidly growing body of law and jurisprudence in this coun-
try on the effect of contraception as a ground for avoiding a marriage
upon the basis of fraud. It can be said at the outset that it is very
doubtful if at this time an enlightened American court would make such
statements concerning the end of matrimony as did the House of Lords.
But, as will be seen, the same result might be reached through different
reasoning. The decision in the House of Lords was not cause for sur-
prise or consternation. The reasons for the decision, however, under-
mine the basic principles of the law of marriage as it has been consti-
tuted by God and as it has always existed.
In order properly to understand the law as it exists today, it is neces-
sary to dwell briefly upon the possible rationale of an annulment on the
grounds of contraception. This rationale is to be found in the doctrine
that any fraud material to the inducement of the marriage contract,
which goes to the essence thereof, and by which the other spouse is
really deceived, is cause for an annulment on the ground of fraud.2
Certainly, as will afterwards be seen, an ecclesiastical court, applying the
principles of the canon law, would employ entirely different reasoning
to reach similar conclusions, if the facts of the case warranted an eccles-
iastical decree of initial nullity.
At the common law of England, the courts, not too far removed
from the ecclesiastical jurisdiction which formerly adjudicated marriage
1 1948 A.C .... See Time, Feb. 2, 1948, p. 40.
2 MADDEN, PERsos AND DomEsTic RPumAIONs 13, and cases cited therein.
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cases, would not recognize fraud in the inducement of the marriage con-
tract as a basis for an annulment thereof. The ecclesiastical courts,
as will be seen more fully shortly, treated the subject of fraud as mis-
representation as to the subject matter of the contract of matrimony,
to the ends thereof, or to the identity of a person, and not as a "de-
ception which induced a marriage which the complaining party intended
as such, with the party he intended to marry." 3
The doctrine of fraud first appeared in America in the guise of du-
ress. 4 In the first important recorded case on the subject,5 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave an interpretation to a divorce
statute, holding it to mean that fraudulent misrepresentations affecting
the essence of a marriage contract would permit the deceived spouse to
avoid the contract. This proposition remains the law to this day.
Since 1900 the cases have multiplied rapidly, and now practically all
states carry annulment statutes which authorize annulment on the
ground of fraud. However, the same interpretation is usually given to
the law whether or not a statute exists.6
Any consideration of contraception by the courts must necessarily
be related to fraud in its contractual meaning, since it must stand upon
the doctrine of fraud going to the essence of the marriage contract
rather than upon the canonical concept of the "end of marriage" per Se.
It will not be based upon the sacramental-contractual idea of the canon
law, in view of the fact that the end of marriage is susceptible of vary-
ing interpretations by different courts. It is here that the danger of ex-
tension of the reasoning of the House of Lords seems to lurk. For an
understanding and comparison of the basic principles of the doctrine of
both civil and canon law, and their application to contraception cases,
it is desirable first to examine the canon law on the subject.
As has been previously indicated, the Catholic Church views the
procreation of children as the primary end of marriage, as Canon 1013
of the Code of Canon Law specifically enacts. 7 In the canonical view,
the nature of marriage, while based on a free-will contract, is elevated
to the dignity of a sacrament. Its roots are deep in natural and divine
law, and its necessary monogomy is based upon the inherent nature of
man as a rational being.
s Ibid.
4 Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopk. Ch. (N.Y.) 478, 14 Am. Dec. 554 (1825).
5 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605, 85 Mass. 605 (1862).
G MADDEN, PERsoxS AND Domisc R.ATxoNs, 14.
7 "The primary end of marriage is the procreation and education of children;
its secondary end is mutual help and the appeasement of concupiscence. The es-
sential properties of marriage are unity and indissolubility, which acquire a spe-
cial stability in Christian marriage in virtue of its sacramental character." CANoN
1013, Txn CODE oF CANoN LAw.
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Because of this nature of valid Christian marriage of baptized con-
sorts, the Church considers it to be indissoluble. "What God hath joined
together, let no man put assunder."8 As Canons 1015 and 1118 of the
Code of Canon Laws specifically declare, there is no such thing as a
divorce obtainable in the Catholic Church from the bonds of a consum-
mated marriage between two baptized consorts.
Consequently, references to the sentences of ecclesiastical courts as
"divorces" are misleading and entirely erroneous.
The ecclesiastical remedy for a "marriage" not contracted according
to the laws of the Church, or one in which no real consent has mutual-
ly been exchanged, is an authoritative adjudication that no true contract
ever existed ab initio. Here there is no real severance of the marriage
tie, for no valid or sacramental marriage ever existed in fact. The Church
issues a declaration of the nullity of a matrimonial alliance, ab initio, in
cases of impotency, nonage, consangunity, affinity, and certain other
impediments, some of which are also recognized by the common law
and the courts of this country. While the roots of these impediments
are generally based on the natural law or divine law as expressed in the
canon law, the present day civil law does not take cognizance of them
as canonical, but recognizes their origin only historically. The basis of
civil annulments is civil only, and is determined by the exigencies of
expediency, by experience, and by social policy.
The Church's procedure in cases involving consent to the marriage
is directly related to the problem here at hand, for it is within this realm
that contraception cases arise. The Church recognizes marriage as based
on contractual consent. So too does the state. The Church, however, as
seen above, views the resulting contract as elevated to the dignity of a
sacrament. Elements, therefore, which would not invalidate a civil mar-
riage on the ground of fraud, such as a marriage with a condition
against the permanency of the marriage, may be grounds for a canonical
declaration of the initial invalidity of the marriage on the ground of
lack of consent. Nevertheless, declarations by the Church of the nullity
of marriage contracts which were invalid ab initio are very infrequent
in view of the Church's conscientious carefulness in preparing contract-
ants for the proper understanding of the sacred and enduring nature
of the Christian marriage contract. Furthermore, in view of its sacra-
mental character, there is no human power or cause, except death, which
can dissolve a valid and consummated marriage of two validly baptized
persons, as Canon 1118 of the Code of Canon Law enacts.
When any future condition contrary to the substance of the mar-
riage contract is attached thereto by either consort, or by both, without
which condition the marriage would not be contracted, the marriage is
s Ephesians V, 21-30.
NOTES
invalid. 9 Thus, an absolute condition, placed at or before the marriage,
that the consort or consorts would not enter into the marriage if it
were indissoluble, which condition is contrary to the substance of mar-
riage, would be a sufficient cause for declaring the nullity of the mar-
riage ab initio.10 Accordingly, the practice of contraception, with the
firm intent of totally excluding children from the marriage, so long as it
should endure, which condition, placed at or before the marriage, was a
sine qua non thereof, would likewise be cause for annulment."
It is to be clearly understood at this point that the mere practice of
contraception alone would not be a basis in canon law for a declara-
tion of the nullity of a marriage ab initio. The law of the Church makes
a very clear distinction in cases of simulated matrimonial consent be-
tween the firm intent of not contracting a valid marriage and the in-
tention of contracting a marriage but not living up to its sacred obli-
gations in relation to the "boon of progeny". Experience proves that
most people who are unfaithful to their marriage vows contract a real
marriage fully accepting the marriage contract and obligating them-
selves to it. At the same time, however, they may have the firm inten-
tion of abusing their matrimonial right by insisting on contraception
and even abortion. In such cases, the marriage is unquestionably valid
in view of the juridical fact that the intention of contracting a valid
marriage and of obligating oneself thereby can well coexist with the in-
tention of violating the obligations assumed in the marriage contract.
Consequently, it is clear that a couple could practice contraception in
abuse of their marriage obligation without thereby nullifying their mar-
riage contract, which was valid ab initio and remains valid despite the
practice of contraception.12
When the very right to the conjugal act is clearly and definitely ex-
cluded from the matrimonial contract by a positive act of the will of
the contractant, the marriage is invalid according to the law of the
Church. The reason is that the absolute and positive exclusion of the
right to the conjugal act has deprived the contract of the primary pur-
pose of marriage. Hence, there can be no valid contract. Consequently,
in a case like this the question would not be the performance or non-
performance of the act proper to the state of matrimony, but it would
be a matter of the absolute exclusion of the basic right that is essential
to marriage, which thereby constitutes the marriage invalid, ab initio.' 3
9 -WILLIAM J. DOHENEY, C.S.C., CAoNicAL PROCEDuRE iN 1MfATRf O=Al
CASES, I, 944 (1948).
10 Id. at 983-1003.
11 Id. at 950-978.
12 Id. at 857-895.
13 Id. at 890.
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A brief discussion of two Rota cases may help to illustrate the points
just made. In one case, 14 A and L were married, but only after the hus-
band had placed a conditio contra bonum prolis (condition against the
boon of progeny) in the contract, to which condition the wife had as-
sented. The court held the marriage invalid ab initio because A never
intended to contract a real marriage with L. A's intent was to consent
to no real marriage, and because of this fact, no consent to a valid sac-
ramental marriage had passed. There was no validity in the alliance.15
In another case, 16 the facts proved that there was really no conditio
contra bonum prolis. In fact, if there was any semblance of such a con-
dition, it was only temporary, because of the state of the wife's health,
and was not intended to exclude children altogether from the union.
There was only to be a delay in the fulfillment of the primary obliga-
tions of the married state. Consequently, the sentence of the Tribunal
of the Sacred Roman Rota declared that the marriage was valid ab ini-
tio.17
It will again be observed that these cases do not group the invalid-
ity of marriages for conditions contra bomum prolis into the general
category of fraud. The so-called marriage is not a real marriage when-
ever both consorts agree to a condition contrary to the essence of the
marriage contract. Similarly, there is no valid marriage contract when
one contractant fraudulently conceals a condition contrary to the es-
sence of the same marriage contract. As will be observed shortly, the
civil law will not annul for a condition contra bonum prolis unless it
is fraudulently concealed.
Returning now to a discussion of the law in this country on the ef-
fect of a condition or intent that there shall be no children in the mar-
riage, it is first advisable to discuss briefly the attitude of American
courts toward the canonical impediments and the end of matrimony.
As has been noted, the civil courts do not give effect to canonical or
other religious impediments in most cases.' 8 Marriage is a civil contract.
True, it has certain peculiarities and is regulated by law more than are
other contracts, but it is not a sacrament as far as the law is concerned.
Its principal end, however, is the procreation of children. That this in-
terpretation of the end coincides with the canonical doctrine is fortun-
ate, but it is not necessarily guaranteed that the two will continue to
coincide.
14 S.R. Rotae Dec., VIII (1916) 139.
15 See WmiLiAm J. DoHENB.Y, C.S.C., op. cit. supra note 9, pp.953-955 for dis-
cussion.
1 S.R. Rotae Dec., XIV (1922) 180 ss.
17 See WirliAM J. DoHENEY, C.S.C., op cit. supra note 9, pp. 957-959 for dis-
cussion.
18 Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N.H. 177, 106 A. 493 (1919).
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The last vestige of direct canonical control in the civil law of matri-
mony passed from the Anglo-Saxon countries on this continent in
1921.19 Previous to that time, the civil courts of Quebec had given the
canonical impediments effect. But in 1921, in the celebrated case of
Despatie v. Tremblay,20 an appeal was taken from the Supreme Court
of Canada, where the canonical impediments had been upheld, to the
Privy Council of England. The decision was reversed. In that case the
parties were fourth cousins, and the Canadian Court, in upholding the
canonical impediment, had recognized the disability of the parties, who
were Catholics. The Superior Court of Canada, which also had upheld
the annulment, had said,
Virtually, article 127 subordinates marriage, as a civil con-
tract, to the authority of the ecclesiastical power, since the
secular power recognizes as validly contracted only that mar-
iage which has been contracted according to the rules ad-
ministered by the ecclesiastical authorities, of whatever de-
nomination they may be. (translated from the French.)
But the Privy Council refused to recognize these principles. The law
of England does not recognize a disability of a religious character. 21
The one possible American exception is the recognition by some
courts, particularly in some New York decisions, that a fraudulent
promise by one party to participate in a religious ceremony after a
-civil ceremony is sufficient fraud to invalidate the marriage.2 2 But even
in New York, and elsewhere, there is authority contrary to this proposi-
tion.23 And whether or not it is given effect by the courts, it cannot
properly be said to be the recognition of a canonical disability, since the
decisions in favor of the annulment have been on the grounds of fraud,
an impediment notxecognized, as weave-een._aL-canonnaawewn_
York, also, the fraud need not go to the essence of the marriage con-
tract peculiarly, as will be seen. As far as the canon law is concerned,
those Catholics who are not married before a priest are not married at
all, and so the question is of more than academic importance in some
19 See generally, Herbert A. Smith, Church and State in North America, 35
YALE Lj. 461 (1926).
20 1 A. C. 702; noted in 30 YAmE L. J. 756 (1921).
21 16 HAi.SBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 283 (1901) § 524.
22 Watkins v. Watkins, 197 App. Div. 489, 189 N.Y.S. 860 (1921); Rutstein
v. Rutstein, 221 App. Div. 70, 222 N.Y.S. 688 (1927); Rosza v. Rosza, 117 Misc.
Rep. 728, 191 N.Y.S. 868 (1922) ; Aufiero v Aufiero, 222 App. Div. 479, 226 N.Y.S.
611 (1928).
23 Schatcher v. Schatcher, 109 Misc. Rep. 152, 178 N.Y.S. 212 (1919) ; Wells v.
Talham, 180 Wis. 654, 194 N.W. 36 (1923); Boehs v. Hanger, 69 N.J.Eq. 10, 59
A. 904 (1905). See: Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605, 607, 44 A.L.R.
714 (1926). See also New York Civil Practice Act (Laws of 1920 c. 925, Art. 68, §
1139.)
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cases. An interesting and confusing case is Mirizio v. Marizio 24 where
the court refused to allow the plea that a promise to be married before
a priest had been made prior to a civil ceremony, while holding, at the
same time, that there was a natural duty on the part of the wife to en-
gage in intercourse and raise a family.
It may be interjected at this point that Baxter v. Baxter was not
decided upon the ground of fraud, but of nonconsummation, which was
claimed by the husband. It is too abstruse a theological problem to say
here what constitutes consummation, but it may generally be said that
the courts in the United States have not decided a contraception case
upon that ground alone, but upon the ground of fraud. Consummation
has been treated only in considering waivers of the fraud.
There is some conflict as to whether or not the fraud which induces
the contract must go to the essence of the marriage contract peculiarly.
Some cases have held that a fraud which would be enough to vitiate an
ordinary contract would suffice. In the classic New York case of Di-
Lorenzo v. DiLorenzo,2 5 the rule was laid down that marriage is a civil
contract, requiring for its validity that free consent which is the essence
of all ordinary contracts, and every misrepresentation of a material fact,
made with the intent to induce the other party to enter the agreement,
and without which it would not have been made, authorized the vaca-
tion of the marriage contract. The general proposition, outside of New
York, remains that the fraud must go to the essence of the marriage
contract.26 In the DiLorenzo case, the court said:
While the marriage contract, in its legal aspects, has no pe-
culiar sanctity as a social institution, a due regard for its
consequences and for the orderly constitution of society has
caued it to be regulated by laws in its conduct as well as in
its dissolution.
The observation may be made that the court has mistaken the en-
tire true concept of the matrimonial relation, has treated it as a con-
venient creature of the civil law, and has implied its essential dissolubil-
ity. This doctrine, of course, squarely conflicts with the canon law and
natural morality.
In New York, as well as in the states where a fraudulent promise
must go to the essence of the marriage contract before a marriage in
reliance thereon will be annulled, it is settled law that a promise to en-
24 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605, 607, 44 A.L.R. 714 (1926).
25 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903). But see dissenting opinion beginning at
page 62 in Schonfeld v. Schonfeld, 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933).
26 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605, 85 Mass. 605 (1862); Allen's
Appeal, 99 Pa. 196, 44 Am. Rep. 101 (1881); Wells v. Talham, 180 Wis. 624, 194
N.W. 36 (1923).
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gage in marital intercourse is implied in the marriage contract, and
that a refusal so to engage, after marriage, wheh the conduct has not
been condoned or waived by the other spouse, is sufficient to invalidate
the marriage because of fraud.27
Implicit in this doctrine is the fact that the courts recognize normal
marital relations as essential to the marriage contract. Included in those
normal relations is the begetting of children, which in the view of the
courts 28 is necessary for the stability of society.2 9 It is upon these
grounds that the fraudulent concealment of an intention not to have
intercourse at all, or to have intercourse so that the natural and ex-
pectable result thereof is thwarted, is sufficient reason to declare an
annulment of a marriage contract when there has been an implied or
express promise to fulfill those obligations.
The development of the law in contraception cases has been very
late. Perhaps this fact results from the comparatively late general ac-
ceptance of artificial birth control devices, which, although extant for
centuries, have only recently come into such wide use that attempts to
control them have proved futile. The first recorded case directly involv-
ing contraceptives was not decided until 1937.80 It is upon the author-
ity of this principal New York case that subsequent cases have been de-
cided.
In that case, Coppo v. Coppo,31 the court held that a husband, who
entered a marriage on the express promise that his wife would have
children, was entitled to an annulment-of the marriage-even-though
there was subsequent intercourse before the discovery of the real in-
tention of the wife. As a rule, the courts are reluctant to annul a mar-
riage when it has been consummated; 8 2 but since, apparently, the
courts agree with the English decision that contraceptive consummation
is really consummation, their annulment of a "consummated" marriage
is upon the basis that the fraud continues until discovery, when any
subsequent intercourse waives it.
After Coppo v. Coppo, other cases clearly intimated that, although
a family was intrinsic to the marriage contract, an agreement between
the spouses not to have children because of contraception would not be
grounds for annulment. This point will be observed in the discussion of
the cases below. By agreement, then, husband and wife are able to live
27 Millar v. Millar, et al., 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394, L.R.A. 1918B 415, Ann.
Cas. 1918 E (1917) and cases cited therein.
28 See: Mirizio v. Mirizo, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (1926).
29 Id.
3o Coppo v. Coppo, 163 Misc. Rep. 249, 297 N.Y.S. 744 (1937).
31 163 Misc. Rep. 249, 297 N.Y.S. 744 (1937).
32 See MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOmESTIC RELATIONS 19, and cases, treatises,
and articles cited therein.
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legally together, in some cases, when no consent to a valid canonical
marriage has ever been given.
In Schulman v. Schulman,83 there was no adequate statement of
facts in the reporter. From subsequent cases, citing the Coppo and
Schulman decisions, it may reasonably be inferred that the wife in the
Schulman case had insisted, after marriage, on the use of contraceptives.
Previous to the marriage, nothing had been said about children. The
court held that the wife's silence as to children implied her acquiescence
to usual marital implications, and that subsequent insistence on her
part as to when she would have a child constituted injecting into the
marriage contract a provision that the law does not place there when
parties enter into the contract silently. This case clearly implies that
there would be no grounds for annulment when both parties consented
to contraception.
But a controversy as to the number of children is harder to prove as
fraud. In Bokok v. Bohok,84 the Coppo and Schulman cases were
cited as authority. The court there said that it would be necessary to
prove that there was a continuing fraudulent intent, notwithstanding
the birth of a child, unknown to the deceived party, and that the de-
ceived party did not acquiesce in the fraud. The implication here that
the marriage would be annulled under those circumstances seems very
unsound, and is probably due to the loose so-called "New York" rule,
since few courts would hold that a restriction on the number of children
would be a fraud going to the essence of the contract.
A waiver of the fraud will constitute a bar to an annulment action
in most cases. In Dodge v. Dodge,35 the defendant promised the plain-
tiff that, in addition to embracing her religion, subsequent to the cere-
mony, he would have a family. Shortly after the ceremony, when the
defendant had marital intercourse with the plaintiff, he used a contra-
ceptive. She acquiesced in this contraceptive intercourse because he said
that he was about to be drafted and that having a family should await
his return. The court held that by her acquiescence she was put upon
notice of the fraud, so that either the promise did not concern a mat-
ter which the plaintiff considered material, or her acquiescence with
knowledge was a waiver of the fraud.
And in Gerwitz v. Gerzitz,3 6 the defendant husband agreed to have
children, but after the marriage he insisted on using contraceptives.
The wife submitted to this practice for three and one half years, when
she finally brought suit for annulment. There was held to be a waiver,
and no annulment was granted. There the court said,
33 180 Misc. Rep. 904, 46 N.Y.S. (2d) 158 (1943).
34 186 Misc. Rep. 991, 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 560 (1946).
35 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 264 (1946).
86 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 327 (1945).
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Implicit in the marriage contract is the representation that
the parties will have normal and natural relations, and that
they will not do anything which will frustrate the normal and
natural-result of those relations. Where nothing is said prior
to the marriage by a spouse on the subject of children, it is
presumed that he or she intends to enter the marriage contract
with all the implications, including a willingness to have chil-
dren.
The fraud does not consist in the failure to have children,
or the failure to have normal and natural relations. The fraud
consists of the promise to have proper relations without any
intention of keeping the promise to deceive the other spouse.
Here, again, the court is bedeviled by the spectre of the ever-pres-
ent idea of a mere civil contract. It is here again implied that in the ab-
sence of any such agreement by an express exclusion of children from
the marriage, no annulment can possibly be obtained because there
would be no fraud. The quoted statements seem to be an adequate sum-
mary of the attitude of the courts in general.
A much better perception of the true end of matrimony is observed
in Hafner v. Hafner.37 Here the court, while it denied an annulment
because there was cause to believe that a fraud was being worked upon
the court, laid down very blunt observations concerning the real nature
of marriage and the natural law. The court, through Judge Walsh, said,
The primary end of marriage by the law of nature is the
procreation of children. It is the plan of nature and of nature's
God for the perpetuation of the human family. Each spouse
has a right to expect that the other will accept the obligations'
as well as the privileges and rights of marriage.
It is common knowledge, however, that sometimes both
spouses enter marriage intending not to have children. They
use devices to prevent the birth of children. Many people
know, but some apparently do not know, that such practices
are contrary to the natural law.
The judge, however, did not feel that he could annul the marriage un-
der the law, because the spouses had been married six years. Reference
was made in the opinion to a growing practice in New York of using
this means to avoid an unhappy marriage. Apparently there are many
cases which are not reported, because the judge took occasion to cas-
tigate those who brought such suits into court, and, by answering mere-
ly "yes" or "no." to leading questions from their attorneys, sought to
prove fraud in the practice of contraception. Hafner v. Hafner appar-
ently was such a case.
37 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 442 (1946).
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In Berger v. Berger,38 it was held that the fact that the husband
cohabited with the wife for nearly eleven months after the marriage
did not constitute condonation.
There seems to be but one case outside the New York jurisdiction on
the point of contraception as fraud. This case is reported from Mich-
igan.3 9 Obviously, the easy divorce laws in most states are the reason.
Where such divorce laws exist, people with no religious scruples to the
contrary obtain divorces, often collusive, while Catholics have recourse
to the ecclesiastical courts and then to the regular divorce courts when
the marriage has been declared null ab initio according to the laws of
the Church. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly many cases decided
upon the point each year, but, as so many divorce and annulment ac-
tions are uncontested, no appeals from the decision of the lower courts
are made. For that reason the law on many points of marriage and di-
vorce is still sketchy.
In the Michigan case, it was decided that a husband who married
his wife on the promise that she would have children was entitled to an
annulment on the basis of fraud going to the essence of the marriage
contract when the wife, after marriage, refused to have intercourse with
him unless contraceptives were used.
Such, then, is a general view of the few decisions relating to con-
traception and annulment. Since they come from but two states, it
may be folly to draw from them any general observations. However,
they rest upon well-defined and well-settled points of law. There seems
to be no reason why other courts would not follow them should a case
arise. But a recent New Jersey case, 40 stating that morality was a
matter of mores, might be expanded into a reiteration of the notion of
the House of Lords.
Undoubtedly, the attitude of the courts toward marriage is secular.
But our society is composed of many religious groups, none of which
have any special standing under the law. Since the courts have not rec-
ognized canonical impediments as such for many years, it is not to be
expected that they will do so now. That they are generally agreed that
the prime end of matrimony is the procreation of children is to their
credit, and one should not be too exacting in requiring that they con-
form to the views of the canon law in toto. It would be bootless to ad-
vocate such a fundamental change in American law. As long as the
courts do not depart from the true doctrine in the direction of the opin-
ion of the House of Lords, we cannot, at this time, expect much more
from them. They can, and should, clarify what they mean by "consum-
38 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 384 (1947).
39 Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N.W. 252 (1940).
40 Petition of Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D. N. J. 1947).
